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The resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chance of getting a unique
monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking. When those businesses differ in the costs
of producing the monopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that has not
been studied in the literature. If the high cost producer wins the license, the difference
between his cost and the costs of his more efficient rival is a social loss from improper
selection of producers by the political process. The loss becomes more severe when the
ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstrips that of the efficient producer. This
may help to explain why specialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces the
social cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficient producers to hire expert
rent-seekers and so to raise their chances of gaining monopoly concessions. Keywords:
Rent-seeking, economic efficiency. J.E.L. classification: D61, D72
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1. Introduction
The rent-seeking literature has focused on the costs of the contest for government favour.
Little attention has been paid to who wins the contest. In some rent-seeking contests who
wins is important. Consider two cable companies pleading for a broadcast license. If the
company with high transmissions costs wins the broadcast license, more of society’s resources
are devoted to sending TV signals than had the low cost company won. The difference
in costs between rivals is a deadweight loss. Such deadweight losses are the focus of the
present paper.
A comment by Vito Tanzi (1982) shows that the general notion of deadweight costs from
improper selection has existed for some time in the public finance literature. In a paper on
the underground economy Tanzi wrote that "Untaxed underground activities will compete
with taxed, legal ones and will succeed in attracting resources even though these activities
may be less productive...There will of course be significant welfare losses associated with
this transfer." Tanzi was not talking about rent-seeking. Rather, his idea was that sometimes
inefficient producers with good evasive skills can oust efficient producers with poor evasive
skills. In a related paper (Palda 1998) I formalized this notion and suggested it could be
extended to political markets. In the political market, there is a chance that high cost producers
will win production rights from low cost producers. Demsetz (1984) touches briefly on this
point in his piece Purchasing Monopoly in which he suggests that "The monopoly may turn
out to be a more costly producer than the competitive industry being monopolized." I follow
the lead given by these two scholars to suggest that the political process is a test of survival
whose outcome may be at odds with economic efficiency. The costs of improper selection
by the political process may rival traditional rent-seeking costs.
Deadweight losses sometimes attract the attention of political reformers eager to craft
institutions that will lessen waste. The danger of loss from improper selection of firms by
the political process may explain why the law allows specialized lobbying firms to peddle
their services to businesses. Professional lobbyists allow efficient producers to raise their
chances of winning government licenses. This cuts down on the deadweight losses from
improper selection.3
2. A rent-seeking model
The theme of this paper is that deadweight loss from the improper selection of high cost
firms (called here "selection costs") may have to be added to the traditional costs associated
with rent-seeking to guage the total deadweight losses from political contests. The "traditional"
costs were catalogued by Buchanan (1980) as the efforts monopolists devote to getting a
license, the efforts of bureaucrats to place themselves in a position to receive bribes from
monopolists, and third-party distortions induced by the monopoly. The present paper adds a
fourth category of loss from rent-seeking to this list. This fourth loss are the extra resources
that feed production in the case where a high cost producer has walked away triumphant from
a rent-seeking contest against a low cost producer, and where the high-cost producer cannot
turn around and sell his license to the low cost producer. Examples include non-transferable
fishing quotas, or cable broadcasting licenses handed out by a telecommunications regulatory
board. The fourth loss is not the triangle-loss from monopoly, but rather the extra production
costs from having the least efficient monopoly producing.
To analyse improper selection costs we need a benchmark model of rent-seeking. Tullock’s
(1967, 1980) model is a useful reference. This model provides the structure needed to
develop the point of the present paper.
Consider a world of two producers. The one producer spends E1 lobbying government
for the right to be the sole provider of a cable television service in a region. The other
producer spends E2 in the same quest. The winner gets the right to monopoly revenues of
Rmonopoly. The probability that the first producer snatches the monopoly takes the logistic





where a1 is a parameter that measures the first producer’s ability to translate lobbying expenses
into political pressure. The parameter a2 is the second producer’s lobbying ability and this
producer’s probability of winning is (1 −P). I assume a1 + a2 = 1 for convenience. Figure 1
shows how the probability of candidate 1 winning varies as his own expenditures ( E2) vary
and as the expenditures of his rival ( E1) vary, under the assumption that both candidates
have identical political abilities ( a1 = a2). The figure needs little explanation. The more a4
candidate spends the greater his chances of winning.; the more his rival spends the less the
candidate’s chances of winning.
Equation (1) indicates that firm 1’s probability of winning is a function both of its and
its opponent’s abilities to win ( a1,a 2) and of its and its opponents willingness to invest
resources (E1,E 2) to win. Ability and willingness are linked through the optimization the
candidate follows. Each producer seeks the prize of a monopoly license worth Rmonopoly. If
the first producer has constant production costs of C1, then he is competing for net revenue,
or a "jackpot," of J1 = Rmonopoly − C1. If the first producer takes his opponent’s lobbying
expenditures as given, then he chooses E1 to maximize his expected gain from lobbying:
P(E1,E 2)J1 − E1 (2)
The Cournot equilibrium to this game is E∗
1 = J1P ∗(1 − P ∗) and E∗
2 = J2P ∗(1 − P ∗).1 This







a1J1P ∗(1 − P ∗)








a1(Rmonopoly − C1)+( 1− a1)(Rmonopoly − C2)
(6)
Figure 2 illustrates the above relation between lobbying ability and a firm 1’s costs of
production (the parameters of equation 6), and firm 1’s probability of securing the monopoly
right. The figure maps firm 1’s probability of winning on the assumption that the monopoly
revenue is Rmonopoly = 10 and that firm 2’s costs are 5. The figure shows what happens
when firm 1’s political ability varies from (0,1) and when its costs vary from (0,10). With
1Maximizing P(E1,E 2)J1 − E1 with respect to E1 gives as first order condition that ∂P/∂E1 =1 . This
implies that
a1(a1E1 + a2E2) − a2
1E1
(a1E1 + a2E2)2 =
1
J1
If we multiply both sides of the above equation by E1 the resulting expression can be manipulated to give that
P(1 − P)/E1 =1 /J1 which implies that E1 = J1P(1 − P). The same holds for firm 2.5
no political ability ( a1 = 0) firm 1’s probability of winning is zero, no matter what its
costs. When firm 1’s costs are equal to the monopoly revenue of 10, firm 1’s chooses a
zero probability of winning. Firm 1 invests nothing in winning in this case because its
production costs C1 are equal to the monopoly revenue Rmonopoly so that firm 1 sees no
point in paying money to win a rent-seeking contest with no net return. Figure 2 shows that
firm 1’s probability of winning falls as its costs rise, because as costs rise there is less to be
gained from winning so the firm invests less in winning than when costs are low. There is
a critical range of political abilities and costs above which firm 1’s chances of winning the
contract will be better than 50%. This range is marked off in Figure 2 by the intersection
of firm 1’s probability of winning function, and the plane where P1 = .5. If firm 1’s costs
are high, then its political ability must also be high for it to want to invest in winning the
contest.
So far much of this is standard, but the exposition sets the stage for examining how
rent-seeking losses vary with the model’s parameters. To find the equilibrium amounts spent











(a1J1 + a2J2)2 (7)
Figure 3 shows how the rent seeking expenditures of both firms vary with the model’s
parameters a1 and C1. In the present example I have set C2 = 5 and have allowed C1 to vary
around this from zero to ten. The expenditure graphs show the expected result that close
races (where political abilities and costs are similar) produce similar, and high, lobbying
expenditures by both firms.












If political talents are identical ( a1 = a2) and costs are identical ( C1 = C2) then both firms vie
for the same jackpot ( J1 = J2 = J) and in equilibrium rent seeking costs are .5J; a familiar
result (see Palda 1992).
When C1 >C 2 (i.e. firm one is a less efficient producer than firm two so that its jackpot
is smaller) there is still the traditional rent-seeking deadweight loss of E∗
1 + E∗
2. There is6
also an expected deadweight loss to account for. If the high cost producer should win the
lobbying race, then the excess of his cost above that of the low cost producer must be counted
as a loss from the rent-seeking process. The probability in equilibrium that the high-cost
producer wins is P ∗, so that the expected cost from selection of the high cost producer by
the political process is P ∗(C1 − C2). This expectation of cost is the relevant social loss for
drawing conclusions about the loss, over long-periods, from improper selection of high cost
firms by the political process.




















(C1 − C2) (9)
How do rent-seeking loses that take into account the danger of improper selection of high
cost firms compare with traditional costs? Consider how traditional and selection cost vary
along with the costs of firms and with their political abilities (the parameters of the model).
Figure 4(a) shows the sum of traditional rent-seeking costs of both firms as a function of firm
1’s costs C1, and political abilities a1 (this figure is just the vertical sum of the superimposed
expenditure curves in Figure 3. For simplicity I have assumed that C2 =0 . I could have
allowed firm 2’s costs to vary but this would have given no insights beyond allowing firm 1’s
costs to vary. The figure shows that traditional rent-seeking costs at first rise with firm 1’s
political ability and then past some critical value of a1 these rent-seeking costs fall. As a1
rises towards the critical point, the rent-seeking contest between firms becomes progressively
more even, and both contestants invest progressively more resources to win. As a1 rises past
the critical point the contest becomes progressively less close and the contestants both invest
progressively less. When C1 = 0 the critical point is simply a1 = .5 because in this case the
costs of production are the same for both firms and so do not play a role in determining how
closely matched firms are in their abilities and incentives to win. As firm 1’s costs rise the
critical value of its political ability rises, meaning that for it to wish to invest as much as
firm 2 in the contest, firm 1 must counterbalance firm 2’s lower costs with a higher political
ability.
The comparative statics of firm 1’s costs are less obvious at first glance than the comparative
statics of its political ability. Figure 4(a) shows that for relatively low values of a1, traditional7
rent-seeking costs fall as firm 1’s costs rise. With low political ability it is not surprising that
firm 1 will invest less than before as its cost rise. Firm 2 will also invest less as 1’s costs rise
because the contest becomes less even and so firm 2 can "relax" secure in the knowledge of a
high probability of victory. When firm 1’s political abilities are strong ( a1 is in the zone of .9
to 1), rent-seeking costs rise with firm 1s’ production costs. How can this be? The reason is
that when firm 1’s political abilities are very strong, firm 2 finds itself with a low probability
of winning. As firm 1’s costs rise, firm 1 has less incentive to invest in winning than at low
costs, and firm 2 suddenly perceives the contest as being closer. This emboldens firm 2 to
increase its investments in rent-seeking in such manner as to outweigh the fall in firm 1’s
investments in the contest. This somewhat tortuous description illustrates the complexities
behind the comparative statics of what seems a rather simple model of rent-seeking.
What about selection costs? Under my simplifying assumption that firm 2’s costs are zero,
selection costs are simply P ∗(J2 − J1)=P ∗C1. This suggests that the comparative statics
for selection costs are less complex than those for traditional rent-seeking costs, because the
driving forces that raise selection costs unambiguously are the probability that the high-cost
firm (firm 1) wins the rent-seeking contest, and the costs C1 of the high cost firm. There is
no doubt that large political ability will always contribute to firm 1’s ability to win. So we
see in Figure 4(b) an unambiguous rise in selection costs as 1’s political ability a1 rises. For
rising C1 there are two contradictory effects on selection costs. For low levels of C1 a rise
in C1 will induce firm 1 to lower its investments in rent-seeking and so lower its probability
of winning. This lowering effect on selection costs is counterbalanced by the rise in firm 1’s
costs of production so that the overall effect is to increase selection costs. When firm 1’s
costs are high, Figure 4(b) shows that a rise in production costs leads to a fall in selection
costs. For high levels of C1 an additional rise in C1 has a progressively more discouraging
effect on firm 1’s incentive to invest in victory due to the exponential forces built into the
rent-seeking model by my choice of the probability of victory function in equation (1). The
rapid plunge in firm 1’s probability of winning which the rise in firm 1’s production costs
engenders, more that outweighs the effect on selection costs of a rise in firm 1’s production
costs. The net result is that past a critical level of firm 1 production costs, selection costs
P ∗C1 fall with the rise in C1.
Perhaps the most interesting thing to note about Figure 4(b) is how selection costs tend to8
rise as both firm 1’s production costs and its political ability rise. Figure 4(b) suggests that
a positive correlation between political ability and production costs leads to high selection
costs from the rent-seeking contest. Readers who grew up in Al Capone’s Chicago will grasp
the point easily. This was the golden era of the "rackets." As Kobler (1971) explains, it
was an era when hoodlums drove honest businessmen out of commerce. As a sideline to
his gambling and alcohol businesses, Capone operated a chain of laundry cleaning shops.
He became a partner in operations at the request of the legitimate owner, who had been
intimidated by the gangs who operated rival cleaning shops. At the same time in New York,
gangster Frankie Yale chased cigar producers out of the city and forced his own low quality
smokes with his emblem onto shopkeepers. A "Frankie Yale" became the synonym of a
high priced, low quality cigar. The same issues arise today in transitional countries. Are
the heads of banks and oil companies there because they are the best managers of business
or because they are good at managing violence and graft? The costs of rent-seeking in such
situations are likely to be higher than the traditional rent-seeking analysis would suggest.
In Figure 4(c) I have superimposed the selection cost function of Figure 4(b) with the
traditional rent-seeking cost function in Figure 4(a) to show that selection costs may rival
or exceed traditional costs when the high cost firm has also a high political ability (I have
rotated the axes slightly to give a good notion of the difference between the two types
of rent-seeking cost). The high cost firm’s strong political ability increases its chances of
winning the political contest. Better chances for the high cost firm mean bigger expected
deadweight loss from improper selection. When a firm’s production costs are inversely related
to its political talents, the radical effects of improper selection are toned down. As Figure
4(c) shows, when firm 1’s costs are high, but its political abilities low, it is not likely to win
the rent-seeking contest and the selection cost curve lies below the traditional rent-seeking
cost curve.
3. Conclusion
This paper has proposed that rent-seeking wastes resources in two ways. One waste
comes from the traditional striving for a government license. If the high cost firm wins the
race there is a second form of rent seeking loss: the difference between what it would have9
cost the high and low cost firms to produce. Social loss from improper selection of the high
cost firm can rival traditional rent-seeking loss. The size of selection loss is especially large
when inefficient producers are excellent rent-seekers.
The existence of selection loss may be a piece in the puzzle of why some countries
develop and others stagnate. Selection loss is lowered if inefficient producers with strong
political abilities are able to specialize in lobbying. Such firms would close their factories
and open consulting offices. These offices would sell rent-seeking services to efficient firms
that bumble in the corridors of power. There would still be a waste from the activities of
these firms, but this waste would be a faint echo of the waste from having a high cost firm
do the work of a low cost firm. It is perhaps the countries that manage to separate politics
from production that take a great leap forward on the road to economic growth.
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